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Eugene Gendlin's most profound philosophical achievement has bee n
to show us a way to recover, and to think by means of, the vast real m
of embodied meaning that exceeds all our concepts, distinctions, an d
symbolic forms . In a number of works over the course of his career ,
Professor Gendlin has brought to our attention the amazing intricacy o f
our experience, understanding, and thought that has been overlooke d
and marginalized by mainstream philosophy since the Enlightenment ,
including, most recently, all first-generation cognitive science. By "first-
generation" cognitive science I mean the functionalist view that the min d
and reason can be studied in terms of their functions alone and that thes e
functional relations can be represented by formal symbol systems, espe -
cially formal logics. On this view, which underlies generative linguistics ,
information processing psychology, and classical artificial intelligence ,
the fact of human embodiment plays no essential role in the function s
of mind and reason. This conception of disembodied reason is rooted
deeply in our Enlightenment view of the person that underlies not jus t
our dominant philosophical theories but also makes up much of ou r
common cultural understanding .
In contrast, "second-generation" cognitive science treats the mind,
concepts, meaning, and rationality as embodied, and therefore as no t
reducible merely to functional relations or programs . Recent empiri-
cal studies from such fields as Linguistics, ) psychology, 2 anthropology,s
philosophy, 4 and neurophysiology5 have revealed the role of our bodily
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experience in the grounding and structure of our conceptual systems, i n
the nature of our reasoning, and in the ways we communicate .
Gendlin approaches the embodiment of meaning from a uniqu e
perspective that comes out his intellectual training and clinical work .
First, he was educated as a philosopher with a strong background i n
phenomenology, which accounts for his deep insight into lived experi-
ence and the realm of human meaning and order underlying our forma l
and conceptual distinctions . Second, as a practicing psychotherapist, he
is adept at helping us become aware of hitherto hidden dimensions of
our experience and understanding . Just as psychotherapeutic method s
seek to uncover experiences and structures that have been submerge d
in the unconscious, similarly, Gendlin's philosophical method highlight s
dimensions of meaning of which we are hardly ever aware, and that li e
beyond formal relations and articulate symbols . His works, therefore, are
more than theoretical investigations. They are also practical exercise s
in self understanding intended to change our lives. They do this by
dipping down, over and over again, into the reservoir of meaning an d
thought that makes up our embodied experience and that goes beyon d
our formal distinctions and patterns of thought. Gendlin thus employs
a unique blend of phenomenological and psychotherapeutic method s
that lets us think and feel our way back into the complex intricacy of ou r
experience from which the structured, formal aspects of meaning and
conceptualization arise .
Gendlin's work raises a deep philosophical question concerning th e
possibility of gaining access to a meaningful order that exceeds forma l
patterns. What I want to ask is whether Gendlin's way of recovering this
submerged continent of embodied understanding can give us any sor t
of empirically responsible theory of meaning and of inference structure .
Second-generation cognitive science certainly shares Gendlin's concer n
with the embodied and imaginative nature of human understandin g
and reasoning, and it wants to do justice to the workings of this par t
of our experience that has been ignored in most theories of meaning ,
concepts, language, and knowledge . However, Gendlin thinks that it is a
serious mistake to assume that our situated understanding consists solel y
of forms, patterns, and relations that can be symbolically articulated . He
argues that, as soon as we specify these forms and patterns, we necessaril y
overlook or suppress the intricacy of experience that gives rise to thes e
forms. Consequently, Gendlin thinks that even second-generation cogni-
tive science must be guilty of the same mistakes of blindness and exclusion
that he thinks plague any structural modes of explanation . My central
concern in this paper is to examine whether this charge is legitimate and
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to ask what a satisfactory theory of meaning, understanding, and reaso n
should involve .
The question, in other words, is whether our methods of structura l
analysis and explanation limit us to no more than naming what w e
experience as form/structure/pattern and thereby cause us to miss the
way our experience does what it does-the way it implies, points, open s
up, and transforms itself. Do our methods of analysis necessarily cause
us to overlook the working of these dimensions of meaning, becaus e
we can only articulate them via symbolic forms? Is it possible to give a n
empirically responsible theoretical account of the embodied dimensions
of meaning and understanding that underlie our symbolic forms ?
1 . Gendlin's Project: Thinking beyond Pattern s
Gendlin's main project is to recover the situations out ofwhich forms an d
patterns emerge . This is the core of his entire philosophical program,
and he argues that we suffer from a massive cultural forgetting of all of
the intricacy that goes into the making up of our world . As he says, "My
project is to think-about, and with-that which exceeds patterns (forms ,
concepts, definitions, categories, distinctions, rules) ."6 Notice the
precision and economy of this summary thesis. Gendlin wants not only to
theorize about these nonformal dimensions of meaning, figuring out wha t
they are and how they work . In addition, and more importantly, he als o
wants to think in and with them in this very inquiry, for only inithat way
can we grasp that which exceeds forms.
But now we might ask why it should be necessary to try to think i n
these ways. Gendlin 's answer is that the failure to do so condemns us t o
never being able to understand who we are, how language works, or how
we reason. A mode of thinking that employs only forms, distinctions ,
patterns, and rules will necessarily miss the very embodied situationa l
experiences that make these forms meaningful in the first place . The
fateful error, which Gendlin attributes not just to Western philosophy ,
but to our general cultural understanding, is to miss a large part of wha t
goes into making something meaningful to us . We then are tempted to
mistake the forms for that which they inform, and we fool ourselves int o
thinking that it is the forms alone that make something what it is-that
make it real and knowable .
Such a strategy of exclusion leaves out the body and our situated ,
embodied practices, along with all their intricate, complex meaning .
Lakoff and I have documented the denial of the body in contemporary
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theories of meaning and mind, and we have traced this prejudice at least
as far back as Enlightenment philosophy.? In order to get a sense of wha t
this suppressed bodily dimension of meaning and experience consists
in, let us consider one of Gendlin's favorite examples, that of a poe t
searching for the right words in an unfinished line :
The poet reads the written lines over and over, listens, and senses what
these lines need (want, demand, imply,) . Now the poet's han d
rotates in the air. The gesture says that. Many good lines offer themselves ;
they try to say, but do not say-that. The blank is more precise. Although
some are good lines, the poet rejects them .
Thatseems to lack words, but no. It knows the language, since i t
understands-and rejects-these lines that came . So it is not pre verbal ;
Rather, it knows what must be said, and knows that these lines don' t
precisely say that. It knows like a gnawing knows what was forgotten, but i t
is new in the poet, and perhaps new in the history of the world .
Now, although I don't know most of you, I do know one of your
secrets . I know you have written poetry. So I can ask you : Isn't that how
it is? Thismust be directly referred to (felt, experienced, sensed ,
had, ) . Therefore, whatever terms we use for such a blank, that term s
also needs our direct reference .
The blank brings something new . That function is not performed by
the linguistic forms alone . Rather, it functions between two sets of linguistic
forms. The blank is not just the already written lines, but rather the felt
sense from re-reading them, and that performs a function needed to lea d
to the next lines .8
Whether in poetry or in the activities of our day to day lives, w e
all know the kind of experience Gendlin is describing-that experienc e
of, first, coming up with new candidate words for completing the line ;
second, of testing them out to see whether they are "right," or at leas t
"better" ; and, third, of finding the words that seem appropriate an d
that carry us forward in our thinking . Several important points need
to be emphasized regarding such experiences and the ways they reveal
important aspects of meaning and reasoning .
1. There is a nonlinguistic dimension-the nonformal side of the
relation between our intricate experience and our words, symbols, or
other patterns-that gets its fulfilment in and through the words we tr y
out as candidates to complete the line . This other part, thisis not
itself linguistic, in that it is not the word(s) we are seeking for .
2. Yet, neither is it utterly distinct nor separable from the words o r
forms or distinctions . That is why Gendlin says that it is not preverbal,
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since it "knows" when we come up with the best (or at least a better )
linguistic or symbolic expression to fulfill it . Gendlin cautions us agains t
the mistake of thinking that there are two distinct and autonomous side s
of any experience-the felt sense and the formal expression-that coul d
exist without each other. These are not two independent entities that
are only externally related . Instead, they are two dimensions of a single ,
ongoing activity, each one intrinsically related to the other .
Thus, Gendlin argues that we must never think of the formal ,
patterned, "objective" side as somehow copying the subjective side, fo r
that would entail that the words could stand in for, or represent, the
subjective side, and thereby replace it . As he says, "Between the subjectiv e
and objective sides there is not a relation of representation or likeness .
The words don't copy the blank. . . . The explication releases that tension ,
which was theBut what the blank was is not just lost or altered ;
rather, that tension is carried forward by the words ."9 So, we do not have tw o
independent entities externally related, but one continuously developin g
situation that we identify, via reflection, as having these two intimatel y
interwoven or blended dimensions . It is for this reason that the word s
or formal distinctions are not adequate in themselves . If they copied th e
"subjective " side, then that side would be eliminable, replaceable by the
forms and patterns . Conversely, the subjective side, theis what i t
is only in relation to the forms that give expression to it .
3. Notice especially that this nonformal side is not vague, mushy,
empty, or chaotic . It is, as Gendlin says, extremely precise. It knows which
words or forms are appropriate to carry forward the meaning that i s
developing. It is so precise that it rejects many candidates as inadequate .
It is vague, but only in a rich positive sense, namely, it is full of possibilitie s
that are not yet realized, and so it only seems to lack precision . I would
say that it is full of embodied structure, if that term had not been lumpe d
together by Gendlin along with "form" and "pattern . "
4. The blank, thethat the poet seeks to realize or fulfill ,
"carries forward" the meaning that has been developing in the poem ,
or in some ongoing experience we are having, and it points toward wha t
is to come next. Gendlin says that the situation "implies" (in a very broad
and enriched sense) what is to come next as the situation develops . It
implies various possibilities for experience, not in the sense that they ar e
logically deducible from the situation as it is presently formed, but rathe r
insofar as the situation can be carried forward by our pursuing one o r
more of these possibilities .
So, we are living in and through a growing, changing situation that
opens up toward new possibilities and that changes as it develops . That
is the way human meaning works, and none of this happens without
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our bodies, or without our embodied interactions within environment s
that we inhabit and that change along with us . A "situation," as Gendli n
uses the term, thus has as two of its abstract aspects an organism and
its environment . But it would be a mistake, as Lewontin and Levin s
observe, to think of the organism and its environrnent(s) as autonomous ,
independent entities that are only externally related . Rather, organisms
and environments are co-evolving aspects of the experiential processes
that make up situations . l o
This explains why we should not think that our embodied mean-
ing, understanding, and reasoning could ever be adequately thought or
grasped by our concepts, symbols, rules, or patterns . Our situations, with
all of their summing up, implying, and carrying forward, are embodied
situations. Meaning, therefore, is embodied . And neither the "subjective
side" (the nonformal, the nonconceptual, the) nor the "objective
side" (the forms, patterns, words, concepts) is the meaning in itself.
Meaning resides in their situational relation as that relationship develop s
and changes .
Gendlin is both careful and elegant in spelling out the complexity,
the intricacy, and the richness of situations as they work in our lives. lt
But the most urgent question that his subtle analyses raise for me i s
whether it is possible to incorporate these profound insights into a mor e
adequate cognitive science . Over the last fifteen years George Lakoff
and I, along with many others working in second-generation cognitive
science, have believed that our studies of the embodied and imaginative
nature of concepts, meaning, and reasoning are steps toward a cognitive
science that does justice to the embodiment of all human understanding .
Recently, however, Gendlin has argued that our methods do not reall y
allow us to get at the kinds of nonformal thinking that he is investigating .
Let us look at his argument as to why no account of metaphor, or eve n
embodied metaphorical meaning, can capture that part of thought tha t
exceeds all patterns.
2 . Embodied Metaphorical Meanin g
Besides the phenomenological tradition, the only major orientation t o
take seriously the embodiment of meaning is cognitive linguistics, or,
a little more broadly, second-generation cognitive science . Cognitive
linguistics argues that model theory, objectivist semantics, and all for-
malist approaches that rely on formal logic are necessarily inadequate ,
because they cannot account for either the embodied or the imaginative
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dimensions of meaning and conceptual structure . The fundamental as-
sumption of cognitive linguistics is that meaning and value are grounde d
in the nature of our bodies and brains, as they develop through ongoin g
interactions with various environments that have physical, social, and cul -
tural dimensions. The nature of our embodied experience motivates an d
constrains how things are meaningful to us . But besides being embodied ,
meaning is also imaginative, in that it involves image schemas, metaphors ,
cognitive prototypes, metonymies, and other types of imaginative struc-
ture out of which our world is worked.
Classical objectivist semantics treats meaning as an objective rela -
tion between inherently meaningless symbolic forms and mind-indepen -
dent states of affairs existing in the world . Languages are regarded as
formal systems to be modeled using formal logics . The vast majority of
semantic theory and theory of knowledge in the twentieth century i s
some version of this basic idea, from generative linguistics, to model
theory, to artificial intelligence, to theories of epistemic justification .
Such views give rise to the view that all meaning is propositional, and
this, in turn, supports "truth-functional" theories of meaning, in which
the meaning of a proposition is taken to be the conditions under whic h
it would be true or false, that is, the conditions under which it would
have a truth-value . Theories of knowledge from this perspective are
theories of representation concerning how a proposition can stand in
a correspondence relation to some state of affairs in the world .
What all orientations of this kind miss is the embodied and imagina-
tive nature of concepts and the reasoning we do with them . None of them
has any place for the role our bodies play in how we experience and mak e
sense of things, since they mistakenly assume that words and concept s
can get their meanings solely by picking out objectively existing state s
of affairs . Moreover, there is no place in these accounts for the centra l
role played by various kinds of imaginative structure in our concept s
and reasoning. The reason for this is that concepts are supposed to be
"literal" and either to fit or not fit the world . These are supposed to be
objective matters, having nothing to do with how people make sense o f
things, and especially having nothing to do with imaginative devices suc h
as metaphor, which is thought to lack any determinate literal meanin g
(and, hence, any determinate truth-conditions) .
In radical contrast with this traditional objectivist view, recent cog -
nitive science has revealed that the human conceptual system, huma n
languages, and human reasoning are all irreducibly and pervasively
metaphoric and imaginative in nature . Furthermore, we have discovere d
that these metaphors that make up our situations are grounded in ou r
embodied interactions. The metaphors and other imaginative structures
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that make up our embodied understanding are not merely in the words we
use-they are not merely linguistic. Rather, they make up the very struc-
ture of our embodied understanding, and they are thereby structure s
of our conceptual system, of our inferences based on those concepts ,
and of the language that emerges from those concepts . That is why we
call the metaphors "experiential" and not just linguistic, because we ar e
claiming that our very understanding-our mode of being in and havin g
a world-is metaphoric and imaginative .
Obviously, it is impossible here to survey all the types of embodied ,
imaginative structures of understanding that we have been studying,
but they would include at least the following : prototype effects in cat-
egories, radial categories, image schemas, semantic frames, experiential
metaphors, and basic-level categorization . To give some idea of the kind s
of structures involved, let us consider briefly the nature of semanti c
frames, image schemas, and experiential metaphors .
Semantic Frames and Idealized Cognitive Model s
Human beings understand their world by means of idealized cognitiv e
models12 for the kinds of entities, events, and situations we encounter i n
our everyday experience . Recent empirical studies in lexical semantic s
have shown that words do not map directly onto states of affairs i n
the world, but rather are defined by their roles in idealized models o f
situations, which are holistic structures called "frames . "13 Words get their
meanings by the roles they play in frames . A semantic field of words is a
group of words defined with respect to different roles in a single fram e
(e .g ., "buy," "sell," "goods," "price" are defined relative to a commercia l
event in general, for which we have a "commercial exchange" frame) .
A single situation in the world can be framed in different, and ofte n
mutually inconsistent, ways. When frames have structure that extend s
over time, they are called "scenarios" or "scripts." And when they charac -
terize our common understanding of how something works in the world ,
they are called "folk theories ." Frames are imaginative, not only because
they are idealized models that do not exist objectively "in the world," bu t
also because they are defined partly by image schemas and experientia l
metaphors .
Image Schema s
Systems of spatial relations have been found to differ considerably amon g
the languages of the world . However, they all appear to use a single set o f
"primitive" image schemas, that is, schematic mental images . Examples
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of such image schemas include containers, paths, links, compulsive force,
attraction, contact, balance, center periphery, orientations (e .g., above-
below, front-back, up-clown) . All of these are recurring structures of our
bodily interactions in the world, and they exist across all our perceptual
modalities (visual, tactile, olfactory, aural, etc .) . They are not fixed struc-
tures or images, but rather dynamic patterns of our interactions withi n
various evolving environments . At present, they are being modeled in
terms of known types of neural structures in the brain, such as topo-
graphic maps, center-surround architecture, orientation tuning cells, etc .
Such modeling indicates that image schemas can be characterized neu-
rally, and that their peculiar properties arise from the neural structure s
peculiar to our brains, given the nature of our ongoing interactions with
the kinds of environments we inhabit .
Image schemas define spatial inference patterns . For instance, if
object A is inside container B, which is inside container C, then object A
is inside container C . Such spatial inference patterns can be the basis for
abstract inference patterns . Conceptual metaphorical mappings appear
to preserve image-schematic structure (e .g., patterns of containment) ,
and, in so doing, they map spatial inference patterns onto abstract infer-
ence patterns.14 Thus, for instance, we reason abstractly that if concept
A is "contained within" concept B, which is "contained within" concep t
C, then A is contained in C-that is, if A is in B, and B is in C, then A i s
in C. There is considerable evidence of this sort to suggest that abstrac t
reason arises from the interplay of metaphors and image schemas, an d
that it is grounded in our bodily experience . 1 5
Since image schemas are not in the "objective world , " but arise from
properties of our bodies and brains acting within environments, they d o
not have a purely objective character . But since they are determined in
part by our biology and by the world as we experience it, they are no t
purely subjective either.
One of the most philosophically important consequences of wha t
has been discovered about image schemas is that they both characterize
basic inference patterns and are themselves characterized by the natur e
of our bodies and brains, relative to our purposes and situational inter-
actions . The idea that inference patterns can have a bodily basis is utterl y
inconsistent, both with objectivist views of pure, transcendent reason, a s
well as with deconstructivist views of reason as the arbitrary play of an
unfettered imagination .
Experiential Metapho r
Research in cognitive linguistics has revealed a vast system of thousand s
of mappings across conceptual domains that permit us to understand
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more abstract concepts in terms of more concepts tied to our embodie d
interactions. 16 These mappings preserve image schemas, and thereby
allow us to use the "logic" of physical space and our spatial experienc e
as the basis for abstract inference . They permit abstract inference by
mapping knowledge about concrete domains onto abstract domains . The
"container logic" of classical Aristotelian syllogistic logic is a good exam-
ple of this bodily based reasoning and of the way meaning is embodied .
Over the last two decades numerous studies have appeared that show ho w
our most basic concepts in virtually every area of human life (such as ,
morality, politics, economics, social relations, science, art, and religion )
are understood by us via experiential metaphorical mappings .
For a number of years Lakoff and I called these "conceptual "
metaphors, in order to emphasize two basic points : (1) that metaphor s
are not mere matters of words, but actually structure our concepts an d
our reasoning; and (2) that they are not merely formal structures, but
rather are embodied imaginative structures . Since many people have
misinterpreted the term "conceptual metaphor" as referring only t o
abstract, formal, propositional structure, when, in fact, these metaphor s
depend on our nonpropositional embodied experience, it is perhap s
more accurate to call these "experiential" metaphors. This captures the
fact that they are not just intellectual forms, but rather are the very stuf f
of our world as we experience, conceptualize, and reason about it .
As an example of embodied, experiential metaphor, I gave an ex -
tended account in The Body in the Mind of some of the ways in whic h
metaphors of balance are tied into our bodily experience of balance .
Beginning with the balance image schema that is present in our bodily
sense of being balanced and losing our balance, I then argued that ou r
other, less obviously bodily, senses of balance were metaphorical map-
pings that carry forward a basic balance image schema . These metaphor-
ical senses included the notions of psychological balance, emotiona l
balance, perceptual balance (as in our sense that a painting is balance d
and well ordered with respect to its color values, negative and positiv e
space, and visual "forces"), moral and political balance (as in equality,
justice, fairness), and mathematical balance (as in arithmetical equality ,
or balancing of equations) .
The point of this analysis was to help us to stop thinking of meanin g
as disembodied and formal, by showing how it grows out of our embodie d
experience in the world, which it calls up and draws upon even in ou r
most abstract conceptual understanding . It is in this sense that meaning
is embodied and imaginative . It is in this sense that we speak of metapho r
as experiential and conceptual. On this view, even our understanding o f
"balancing" a mathematical equation is tied up with our mundane sense
of bodily balancing . The balancing we do with, and feel within, our bodies
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is submerged and not attended to in our mathematical reasoning, but i t
is nonetheless there, by virtue in part of the balance schema that works in
our metaphorical understanding of mathematical equality and balance .
3 . Gendlin's Critique of Cognitive Linguistics
Gendlin applauds the emphasis that cognitive linguistics places on em -
bodied meaning:
Both Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) in their new books talk o f
something that is not just a pattern or a logical form . Johnson speaks
of "concrete and dynamic, embodied imaginative schemata," which are
surely not just logical patterns or images or diagrams. Lakoff talks of
something "non-propositional." They have taken up an excellent strategic
position, right on the interface, where they can assert both this embodie d
character, and also work on the logical side to collect and formulate wha t
I have been calling "patterns that can be the same ."Z 7
Although Gendlin approves of our focus on the bodily basis o f
meaning, he worries that cognitive linguistics works exclusively "on th e
logical side," and thus risks missing the full richness of the situatio n
itself. The source of the problem, according to him, is that the cross -
domain mappings that define experiential metaphors (i .e ., the mapping s
of entities and structures in one domain onto another domain of a
different kind) are seen as being too structural. Gendlin proposes tha t
"the embodied non-propositionals should not be thought of as if they
were commonalities, classes, structures, or image schemata, although ,
we do also want to formulate those . I will try to show that the embodie d
non-propositionals function differently, not like commonalities or imag e
schemata . "1a Gendlin's strategy is to show that we are not limited merel y
to thinking "with forms," which is what he thinks cognitive semantics i s
restricted to . In addition, we can learn to think "how they (the forms )
are exceeded in use ."1 9
I will argue that Gendlin's criticisms bear only on the classica l
theory of metaphor and not on a cognitive semantic theory. In fact,
cognitive semantics lends empirical support to Gendlin's point of view.
Still, it must be acknowledged that no current theories, either thos e
of cognitive semantics or any other perspectives, have so far given an
adequate account of the nonpropositional dimensions of metaphor, o r
of meaning generally. I shall end up suggesting that, indeed, this inability
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to capture that which exceeds structure is a fundamental problem for al l
theories of meaning . About this, Gendlin is right, but his own account
has certain limitations, too. In particular, it is not clear how his view can
lead to empirical generalizations of the sort needed for a semantic theory
and a theory of reasoning .
Gendlin's criticisms are directed against the traditional view o f
metaphor as a pairing of preexisting commonalities between two concep-
tual domains that exist independently, each with its own fixed structure .
Gendlin correctly challenges this view on four counts . I want to suppor t
each of Gendlin's four critiques with evidence from cognitive semantics ,
and thereby to show that cognitive semantics has considerable resource s
for a theory of meaning and of metaphor of the sort Gendlin is proposing .
1 . According to the classical view, a metaphor operates by highlight -
ing preexisting similarities between two conceptual domains : "Classically,
metaphor was said to be a crossing between two single situations. "2° The
metaphor supposedly pairs up fixed structure in one domain (the source )
with that in another domain (the target) so as to emphasize features tha t
are similar across the two domains . The metaphor "Love is a journey, "
for example, would be understood under the classical view as matchin g
preexisting features of journeys with those of love that are the sam e
or similar.
Gendlin correctly observes that this cannot be all that metapho r
does, for then there would really be no point in using metaphor . Beyond
its possible rhetorical effects, such a metaphor could be replaced by a
list of literal similarities between the two domains . Thus, Gendlin 's first
modification of the classical view is to insist that what is crossed in a
metaphor are not two preexistent situations, but rather a whole "use -
family" of the source domain term with the present situation in whic h
the term operates as a metaphor. 2 ' By a "use-family" Gendlin means th e
entire family of situations in which a term has been, is, or can be, used .
Gendlin's notion of a "use-family" is captured in cognitive semantic s
by the notion of semantic frames . 22 Frame semantics shows that any given
term will get its meanings relative to one or more semantic frames i n
which it is situated . As we saw earlier, within a given frame a term is define d
in relation to a cluster of other terms that fall within that frame. For
instance, one semantic frame for the term drive would include a complex
cluster of terms related to all of the things we do with automobiles, includ -
ing such terms as "vehicle," "start," "accelerate, " "steer," "brake," "car, "
"stop," and many, many more . This would be merely one of many possibl e
frames, all of which would form a very complex category structure fo r
the concept drive, including frames that involve boats, golfballs, baseballs ,
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Gendlin is correct, then, to insist that the whole use-family come s
into play in metaphor, and that no traditional similarity theory of meta-
phor can be adequate to this dimension of metaphor. Metaphors are
almost never simply matters of matching preexisting cross-domain simi-
larities. The problem is not just metaphor, but rather the entire objectivis t
and literalist theory of concepts that underlies the similarity view . By em-
ploying a frame semantic analysis of concepts, cognitive semantics thereb y
avoids this kind of reductionism and literalism, and it is compatible with
Gendlin's notion of the use-family.
2. Gendlin's second criticism is that "the commonalities do no t
determine the metaphor. Rather, from the metaphor, and only after i t
makes sense, is a new set of commonalities derived."23 Again, Gendlin
is right to claim that in many cases the meaning of a metaphor is not
determined by some underlying set of features that are common betwee n
the source and target domains. In Metaphors We Live By Lakoff and I
argued this same point at length by showing that in many cases we perceiv e
similarities only as a result of the metaphorical mapping that induce s
them . 24 We described five kinds of situations in which metaphors "cre-
ate" similarities . The crux of our argument is that many metaphors ar e
based on experiential correlations that then make possible our subsequent
perception of commonalities between the two domains . For example ,
while there is no intrinsic commonality or similarity between "more " and
"up," we have the basic conceptual metaphor more is up in our culture
(and apparently in all cultures) that is based on experiential correlation s
of the following sort: when we add more entities to a pile, the profile of the
pile rises (goes up) in our perceptual field. The same experience occurs
when we add more liquid to a container-the level rises . This experiential
correlation is one possible basis for the more is up metaphor (as in, "Th e
number of murders committed keeps going up each year," "The divorc e
rate is rising, " "The gross national product reached a peak last quarter, and
now its starting down") . Because of the more is up metaphorical mapping, i t
then seems natural to us that there are commonalities perceived betwee n
"more" and "up" that we do not perceive between "less" and "up ."
In The Body in the Mind I also gave an extended example of the expe-
riential correlations that ground the purposes and destinations metaphor
and that create our sense of commonalities between the domains of
physical motion and the achievement of some intention or purpose . The
experiential basis for the metaphor is the frequent correlation that we
experience between the achievement of a purpose or the satisfaction o f
an intention, on the one hand, and movement through space to som e
destination, on the other. An example of this would be the case of a baby
satisfying her purpose of getting the rattle by crawling to the place where
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it is and grabbing it. The experiential pairing of moving to a destinatio n
with achieving a purpose gives rise to the following purposes are destination s
mapping :
Physical Motion Domain Intentional Domain
Starting location A Initial stat e
Goal (final location B) ---, Final (desired) state
Motion along path (from A to B) -C Intermediate actions
Our sense that there are commonalities between the domains o f
physical movement and achieving purposes is thus based on this meta-
phorical conceptual mapping, which is, in turn, based on the experiential
correlation between structures in the two domains, as noted earlier .
It is a mistake to think of a metaphor as a set of similarity statement s
in the first place . A set of cross-domain mappings is not a set of similarity
statements. In order to see this crucial point, consider the mapping for
one of our culture 's basic conventional metaphors for love . Someone
who experiences their love relationship to have "hit a dead-end" and to
be "going nowhere " is conceptualizing love as a journey, according to th e
following conceptual mapping :








Impediments to travel Difficultie s
Destination Common goals
This mapping, which underlies the love is a journey metaphor, is the
basis for all kinds of inferences we make about our love relationship .
Based on these ontological correspondences given above, we use ou r
knowledge of the source domain (journeying) to understand and reaso n
about the target domain (love) . Consequently, the way we conceptualize ,
reason about, and talk about our love relationship will be determined by
the epistemic entailments that are based on the ontological correspon-
dences given above . Which parts of our knowledge are brought into play ,
and how they are developed, will depend on the context . If, for example ,
one of the lovers should complain that, "This just isn't going anywhere, "
we can use the epistemic correspondences (based on our knowledge of
the source domain of journeying) to understand what they mean and t o
reason about what might be done . If the love vehicle isn't moving ("goin g
T
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anywhere"), then there must be a reason . Perhaps there is a breakdown
in the relationship (i .e., the "vehicle" has ceased to function properly) . .
Then we must decide what is malfunctioning, whether it can be repaired ,
and whether it is worth the effort that would be required to fix it (i .e., "to
get it going again") . Or, perhaps the relationship isn't going anywher e
because it (the relationship-vehicle) has run out of fuel . Maybe there's a
way to energize the relationship to get it going again . Or, we might find
that we're not going anywhere because our progress is blocked (as in ,
"We've hit a road-block in our marriage ") . Then we have to figure out
whether we can go around, or through, whatever is blocking our pat h
(where, for instance, the metaphorical blockage might be a financial ,
sexual, or communication probler I) .
Notice that the reasoning we do in this case is not based just on
commonalities or similarities between the two domains . There is a shared
image-schematic structure between these two domains, namely, the source-
path-goal schema. On the basis of this shared structure, we go further to
take the logic of the source domain and project it onto the target domain
to give rise to new structure in the target domain . This projection i s
actually cognitively constitutive-it is a partial structuring of our concept
of love . It is not the case that the two conceptual domains, journeying and
love, each had the entity "vehicle" in them, and that the metaphor merel y
highlights these preexisting common features or similarities . Instead ,
"vehicle" is an entity in the source domain that gets mapped onto th e
love relationship in the target domain . Only on the basis of this mapping
can we then draw the appropriate epistemic entailments about how w e
might possibly get a stalled relationship going, or get beyond or through
the roadblock, or overcome some obstacle in our path . We understand why
the "course of true love never did run smooth " in terms of inferences
like these that are based on our knowledge of the source domain. In
itself, a love relationship has no vehicles, no roadblocks, no dead-ends,
no breakdowns . It acquires all of these, and the epistemic entailment s
that go along with them, from the metaphorical mapping .
Notice that the metaphor doesn 't work by specifying some fixed
similarity statements concerning the two domains (journeying and love) .
Rather, based on the correspondences, we make inferences, given ou r
knowledge of the source domain . Consequently, the structure of a con-
cept is not an all-or-nothing matter . It is not the case that conceptua l
structure either preexists in a fixed and completed realm of its own, o r
else that it is all radically constructed . As with our concept love, most of
our basic concepts are defined by multiple conceptual metaphors tha t
are sometimes mutually inconsistent (though not incoherent) . There
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will always be preexisting conceptual structure in both the source an d
target domains (as the invariance hypothesis demands), but conceptua l
metaphor will also be partially constitutive of our grasp of the targe t
domain, by virtue of additional structure carried over from the "logic" o f
the source domain .
Work in cognitive semantics, therefore, has given a body of evidenc e
that supports Gendlin's claim that metaphors are often the basis fo r
derived commonalities between two domains of experience . Moreover, i t
goes beyond Gendlin's account to provide a theory of how these apparen t
commonalities can emerge for us in the first place .
3. Gendlin' s third modification of the classical theory rests on hi s
rejection of the view that a metaphor is defined by a single pattern of
commonalities between the two domains . Instead, he argues, "a metaphor
generates an endless chain of commonalities, not a single pattern ."25 His
argument is that any present situation does not just contain structure s
or patterns that define the "here and now" ; rather, a situation implicitly
contains all the possibilities for what will happen in the future and ho w
things will change over time .
Certainly, any metaphor has a measure of open-endedness abou t
it, since it can be extended in many directions, subject to certain limits
on the nature of the mapping .26 In this sense, a metaphor used in a
present situation has the potential to be elaborated in many possible ways ,
developing in a limited set of directions opened up by the mapping . But to
say that there is a "limitless" chain of commonalities that can be generate d
seems to be an overstatement, at best . If Gendlin means only that there
are a large number of future situations in which the metaphor coul d
generate new meaning, then he is correct . However, the commonalitie s
generated are indeed "limited" by the nature of the mapping and by
the kinds of situations human beings can experience . Otherwise, a given
metaphor could conceivably mean anything, which is clearly not true o f
metaphors in use within actual human contexts .
4. Gendlin's fourth and last criticism is the most profound, for i t
claims that the meaning of a metaphor is never reducible to a set o f
commonalities, patterns, or forms . Since Lakoff and I define metaphor s
as cross-domain conceptual mappings, it does seem that Gendlin is crit-
icizing our kind of theory as being too structure oriented, and thereb y
missing an order that exceeds forms .
But just what is Gendlin 's argument for this key claim? First, he
defines a pattern as a fixed, logically consistent, unified conceptual struc -
ture. For Gendlin, a pattern must remain the same wherever it is asserte d
or affirmed, and it must be capable of being either true or false .27
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Based on this narrow conception of a pattern as specified within forma l
logic, Gendlin's argument runs as follows : a metaphor may be used in
two succeeding situations, such that a pattern that we would deny i n
the first situation would then be affirmed in the very next situation .
But, if these patterns really are inconsistent, then the meaning of th e
metaphor cannot be derived from the original pattern alone . There mus t
be something beyond the patterns that gives rise to them . He gives the
example of a poetic line in which a girl standing in a field is calle d
a rose. In our initial understanding of the metaphor we are unlikel y
to think that the pattern "rooted to the ground" would be part of the
meaning. But what if, in the very next line, the poet says that she "stood
stock still, timeless, rooted to the ground"? Obviously, "rooted to th e
ground" can mean something and be appropriate in that context . It
could say a great deal about the kind of person she is . Gendlin argue s
that the metaphor of the girl as a rose cannot, therefore, be define d
by patterns that represent commonalities that remain unchanged acros s
all situations .
While Gendlin is correct in observing that we must account fo r
the open-endness of metaphor, I want to suggest that there is something
misleading about the way he frames the issue . From the perspective of
cognitive semantics, this is not a case of, first, denying that the proposi-
tion "she is rooted to the ground" applies, and then, second, affirming
that it does apply. Rather, this is a case of how our knowledge of the
source domain comes into play as a situation develops . It is part of our
knowledge about roses that they are rooted to the ground . In the first
instance, however, that particular knowledge is not brought forth by th e
situation. In Gendlin's terms we would say that the crossing of the use-
family of "rose " and the situation does not highlight rootedness. But as the
situation develops in the poem, that very knowledge about roses become s
quite important, and it becomes part of the inferences we might dra w
about the girl .
So it is somewhat misleading to describe this example, as Gendli n
does, as a case of first denying the proposition "she is rooted to the
ground" and then turning around and affirming it . It is far more accurate
to say that, as the present situation develops, we make use of differen t
parts of the mapping, along with the corresponding knowledge we hav e
about that particular part of the source domain . What was potentially
present in the logic of the source domain becomes actualized withi n
a particular context . George Lakoff and Mark Turner have recentl y
employed this cognitive semantic theory to show how poetic metaphor s
can be creative by drawing on typically unused parts of conventiona l
metaphorical mappings . 28
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4 . Meaning That Exceeds Structure
We have seen that the traditional similarity theory of metaphor can
treat only the fixed, preexisting conceptual structures . Consequently,
it necessarily misses the nonpropositional and embodied experientia l
basis out of which the formal structure emerges, and relative to whic h
it means and infers what it does . I have argued that cognitive semantics ,
with its emphasis on the embodied and imaginative character of meaning
and reason, can explain many of the semantic phenomena that Gendli n
rightly sees traditional metaphor theory as being incapable of explaining .
Nonetheless, Gendlin correctly asserts that there is an inherent limitatio n
to any theory of metaphor (or meaning generally) that gives only a
structural analysis . What will always be missed by such a view is the affectiv e
dimension, the mood, and the felt sense that lies at the heart of our experience
of meaning.
Cognitive semantics must face this limitation of its methods an d
recognize that it can never tell the whole story about meaning. But this
is a limitation that will pertain to any empirically responsible theory. The
reason for this inherent limitation is the following : an adequate semanti c
theory must make empirical generalizations concerning the phenomen a
it studies . These generalizations are not necessarily limited to proposi-
tional rules or principles . As we have seen, in cognitive semantics th e
generalizations can include such structures as cross-domain conceptua l
mappings of the sort that define conceptual metaphors . The reason
cognitive semantics can go beyond the traditional theories of meaning i s
because it recognizes these other, nonpropositional, forms of explanator y
generalization . In addition to conceptual metaphor mappings, ther e
are metonymic correspondences and also counterpart relations betwee n
entities within different "mental spaces . "29
However, cognitive semantics is limited to identifying and makin g
generalizations about structures of various sorts (whether those structure s
are propositional, nonpropositional, image-schematic, or logical), in or -
der to explain semantic phenomena and inferential structure . While I
acknowledge this methodological limitation of cognitive semantics, I wan t
to ask whether Gendli n 's way of revealing the "order that exceeds forms "
can actually lead to generalizations about meaning and inference, o r
whether it can only serve as a corrective to other semantic theories . In
other words, my final question is whether Gendlin ' s view can contribute
constructively to a semantics of natural language, or whether it can onl y
point out the shortcomings of all semantic theories .
As an example of both the power and limitations of cognitive
semantics, I want to consider a particular experiential metaphor, in order
IA
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to examine its embodied dimensions, and also to determine what in the
metaphor cannot be captured by our analysis . Steven Fesmire has given
an extended analysis of the experiential metaphor mental disquietude is
inhibited breathing, 30 in which we understand various aspects of menta l
unrest and distress in terms of the phenomena associated with inhibite d
breathing . This experiential metaphor is typical of a general conceptua l
pattern people use to understand the mental realm in terms of the mor e
concrete and highly articulated operations of the body. Eve Sweetser has
named this universal generic mapping the mind as body metaphor, and
she has documented its pervasiveness across many cultures .31
The mental disquietude is inhibited breathing metaphor is the basis for
a large number of related expressions that we use to describe anxiety an d
mental dysfunction, such as :
"She was choking with anxiety . "
"Harry choked on the exam . "
"Until she arrived, I was breathless with anticipation. "
"Don't get all choked up over a little test . "
"Let 's take a breather from this debate ."
"The interrogation was suffocating me. "
"Your solution to the problem is certainly a breath offresh air! "
Our understanding of mental disquietude in terms of the physica l
experience of inhibited breathing is but a part of a larger metapho r
system in which we conceptualize mental functioning as breathing . The
mental functioning is breathing metaphor consists of the following mapping :
Breathing
Flow of air





Disrupted flow of ideas
Mental disquietud e
Revived free-flow of ideas
Fesmire identifies other related metaphors that interweave with
mental functioning is breathing, especially those involving the relation o f
breath ("spirit") to consciousness, and the notion of the flow of ideas in
thought . But, for our purposes, it is his analysis of the bodily groundin g
of the mental disquietude is inhibited breathing metaphor that is most rel-
evant. He observes that the metaphor is based on a strong experientia l
correlation between mental tension and restricted breathing. Restricted
breathing can generate tremendous anxiety and mental distress withi n
us. Also, heightened anxiety is often accompanied by inhibited breathing .
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Noting these experiential correlations, Frederick Perls even went so far a s
to claim that "suppression of excitement produces the breathing difficulty
which is anxiety. "32
We can see how this correlation of anxiety with inhibited breathin g
gives rise to the inhibited breathing metaphor by examining three kinds of
mental disquietude .
1.Consider the case of actual restricted breathing due to a blocked
air passage. If something is not done to relieve the blockage, you coul d
die . That is why inhibited breathing generates tremendous anxiety. Once
breathing is restored, you can, quite literally, breathe again, and this i s
accompanied by a felt lessening of anxiety.
2. Consider, secondly, a situation of high anxiety, such as when yo u
are in a life-threatening situation or are subject to some other highl y
stressful condition . Your mental tension will typically be accompanie d
by, as its physical counterpart, inhibited breathing . As the anxiety lessens
and the tension releases, you can breathe once again. This experiential
pairing of mental tension and inhibited breathing can give rise to an
experiential metaphor. The emerging metaphor can be seen in the
ambiguous case where someone in extreme mental distress complain s
that she is "suffocating ." She might, indeed, be actually finding it har d
to breathe. But she might also mean, via metaphor, that she is sufferin g
great anxiety.
3. This emerging experiential metaphor can then be extended
to cover clear cases of metaphor in which there is no actual restricte d
breathing involved . To find a relationship, or a high-pressure meeting ,
or a heated discussion, suffocating may not involve any kind of apparen t
physiological distress . However, even in these explicit cases of metaphor-
ical understanding, the physiological symptoms are often just below the
surface of consciousness, and they are operating even though we are
not presently aware of them . It is often quite difficult to distinguis h
the suffocation you experience in a relationship from an actual sens e
of physical tension and constricted breathing .
The key point I want to make with this example is that the meaning
this metaphor has, and the way it operates in our conceptualizatio n
and reasoning, is thoroughly dependent on its bodily, experiential basis .
In other words, how the metaphor works in our thinking depends o n
experiential pairings, feelings, and the felt sense that accompanies certain
types of situations . Cognitive semantics can describe this experientia l
basis of meaning, in the same way I have given a very partial accoun t
of the mental disquietude is inhibited breathing metaphor. What cognitive
semantics cannot capture in its generalizations, however, is the affectiv e
dimension of this experiential grounding of meaning. We can point to it,
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but we cannot include in our mappings and generalizations the felt sense
that is part of what the metaphor means to us, nor can we include th e
way it works in our experience .
As far as 1 know, there is no theory of meaning or metaphor tha t
can capture this deeply embodied dimension via empirical generalizations .
I am attracted to the cognitive semantics orientation chiefly because i t
can at least talk about and explore embodied meaning, whereas mos t
semantic theories are objectivist in nature, and they pay no attention to
the embodied and imaginative nature of human concepts and reasoning .
What I find that Professor Gendlin does better than anyone else is
to lead us back down into that vast submerged continent of meaning tha t
exceeds our logical forms and patterns . As I said earlier, he does this by
an almost incantational technique that helps us dip down further an d
further into the situation in which meaning is happening here and now.
Gendlin's remarkable blending of phenomenological and psychothera-
peutic methods can open up hitherto hidden dimensions of the proces s
of meaning and experience .
But what Gendlin 's method cannot do is to give us semantic and
inferential generalizations that purport to explain the phenomena o f
meaning and reasoning . Nor does he pretend to do this . Instead, he
wants to assist us to think about, and with, an order that exceeds ou r
logical forms and patterns .
What we need, then, if we want a more empirically adequate theory
of human meaning, understanding, and reasoning is an ongoing dia-
logue between cognitive semantics and Gendlin's method for recoverin g
the meaning and thought that lies beneath logical forms . We need to
explore back and forth across the shifting boundaries that distinguis h
structures and forms from the embodied realm of experience out o f
which those forms emerge and in relation to which those forms have
meaning. We need to seek semantic and inferential generalizations, bu t
always keeping in mind what those generalizations miss . As Professor
Gendlin says, we need to learn to think, not only about that order which
exceeds and grounds forms, but also to think in and by means of it .
Otherwise, we lose touch with the embodied situations that are the locu s
of our experience, our thinking, and our acting .
Reply to Johnson
Ours is a friendly discussion . Johnson says his findings corroborate my
theory of metaphor. On my side I have argued only that if he were to give
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a role in his theory not to "affects" or unspeakable realms as he seem s
to think I want, but to our sense of acting and speaking in situations, w e
would arrive at more and better formulations ; we could cooperate in a
"third-generation" cognitive science .
Empirical findings cannot adjudicate philosophical issues becaus e
philosophy can reinterpret findings and generate new variables . My phi-
losophy should be able to meet Johnson's challenge . From the arena
of intricacy which it opens we can specify many new parameters whic h
can be operationalized . This has already led to what is now the mos t
replicated finding in psychotherapy research . l As I go along here, I wil l
set out specific predictions that my theory of metaphor generates .
We have three main disagreements :
1. I am far from rejecting or lacking theory: I offer a new typ e
with both logical precision and experiential connections (see PM) .John-
son summarizes and likes my theory of metaphor, but he takes me a s
opposing purely conceptual theory. I do not oppose this at all ; I am
only against reading concepts back as if they were "the basis of" th e
process that gives rise to them. That falsifies and hides the process.
Without doing that, we can still gain all the advantages of conceptual
models and logical inferences. Concepts expand experience, practice ,
and thought . They carry experiencing forward. "Carrying forward" is
itself a concept which does that . We can use its logical structure, but
we can also dip into its experiential way of working, and think furthe r
from that as well .
Johnson's concept of metaphorical "frames " lays open the meta-
phoric nature of speech . This success neither requires nor proves tha t
metaphors are "based on" the frames and correspondences .
I take Johnson's empirical findings as seriously as he does : I let his
findings stand on their own, and I think further from them ; he reads
his theoretical framework in behind them, and thinks further from hi s
framework, rather than from what he has found .
2. I think that all word-use involves metaphorical crossing . I know
that Johnson also rejects the notion of "literal" speech along with th e
whole "objectivist " approach, but he sometimes sounds as if he were
speaking literally about the physical motion domain as if it were origina l
or "basic . "2
3. Thirdly, we differ in our conception of the body. Johnson has
included a role of the body in speech, but he speaks of the body in term s
of spatial movements, up, down, or "motion along a path ." For me, the
body's living-in its environmental situation is prior (already in plants) , an d
continues with us also as more "basic" than the spatial grid . We move as
part of living in situations, and only derivatively in a spatial grid . Johnson
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does not include the role of the bodily sense of speaking, or of wantin g
to say or do something to change a situation . He thinks of the body in
space ; I think of it in situations.
Now I will reply to Johnso n ' s critique of the four planks of my theor y
of metaphor.
I . Contrary to a long history, I have argued that a metaphor does not
consist of two situations, a "source domain" and a "target domain ." There
is only one situation, the one in which the word is now used . What the
word brings from elsewhere is not a situation; rather it brings a use family,
a great many situations. Which of the many uses now obtains is known
only if one grasps what the word says now, in the present situation . To
understand an ordinary word, its use-family must cross with the present
situation . This crossing has been noticed only in odd uses which are calle d
"metaphors . "
Since metaphor is the crossing of a use family and a present situa-
tion, we realize that all word-use requires this metaphorical crossing. Johnson
agrees that what he calls the "source domain" is really a use-family, not a
category system, but he also writes of a "very complex category structure ,
for example, for the concept drive, " including "vehicle," "accelerate, "
"car," "brake," "golf balls, " or "nails . " I think he means that it is not a
single order of subcategories . I agree with Wittgenstein that a use-family
does not operate by categories or a concept at all ; it is "only a family
resemblance ." How a use-family functions is not determined by a concept .
Wittgenstein brought up one situation after another in which, as soon a s
we use it, the same word immediately has a new meaning, often unrelate d
to any category system or concept . 3
I would urge going more deeply into the question how we can sense ,
for example right here, that in the phrase "going deeply" more is down.
Johnson has studied what he calls "inconsistent frames," but I ask : How
do we sense which one now obtains? We know it only from grasping wha t
the word says .
Johnson backs away from concepts that include more than thei r
schemes. But concepts like "family resemblance," "unseparated multi-
plicity," and "crossing " enable us to think how the metaphorical meanin g
can be new. IfJohnson included the role played by his bodily sense of th e
ongoing metaphorical mapping, he would find not only concepts, but als o
two unseparated multiplicities . Because he does not speak in this way, h e
sounds as if he assumed that a metaphor is "based on" already discret e
correspondences .
2 . I have argued that commonalities do not determine a metapho r
(or word-use) . Rather, from the metaphor, only after it has made sense ,
can a set of commonalities be derived .
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Johnson first agrees, but then says that I have no theory to explai n
how the commonalities arise . I do have a theory and I do explain it, bu t
my new kind of concepts do not import their schemes behind something .
I will also explain this kind of "explain . "
Johnson praises me for recognizing that the commonalities don' t
precede, but rather come from the metaphor. He says that he too has made
"the same point ." As he puts it "in many cases we perceive similarities only
as a result of the metaphorical mapping that induces them" (my italics) .
He limits his agreement with "in many cases" and also by saying tha t
some similarities were there in advance; only our perceiving them comes
from the metaphor. He says: "The crux of our argument is that [in
Johnson's view] many metaphors are based on experiential correlations that
then make possible our subsequent perception of commonalities between
the two domains" (his italics) . He wants to distinguish between basic
"correlations" and resulting "commonalities ." For example, he thinks he
knows that more is up is "based on" the "correlation" with the experienc e
of adding more to a pile, so that "the profile of the pile rises." But I think
prices "rise" because the numbers get larger, and we count up from 1 .
I know that he has analyzed these and many other cases . He imports a
cognitive scheme in which he formulates the "correlations," and then
selects the fewest that could account for the variety of instances . But
what he calls a "basic" or "experiential" correlation seems no different in
character from all the rest, which he calls "resulting " or "subsequent. "
An empirical question is generated here : I predict that, if asked for
basic correlations, different subjects will come up with different ones, an d
that Johnson's "profile of the pile rising" will correlate no more highly
with those, than some of them with each other .
I don't think the similarities he calls "correlations" are formulate d
before Johnson formulates them . They don't exist before the metaphor
happens. Even afterwards we don't formulate such correlations, unles s
someone fails to understand the metaphor. Then we take time an d
thought in order to come up with similarities to explain the metaphor ,
and differences to say what is not meant. "The girl is a rose"-how ?
She is similar in being soft, fresh, vulnerable, but different in that (fo r
example) she is not rooted to the ground . We say what is similar and what
is different . We explain: by "the pile rises" Johnson means that the top of
the pile rises, not that the whole pile rises .
We both want to speak of the activity of mapping rather than
antecedent or imposed traits . If allowed, words speak from mapping as
it happens. This word "mapping" would acquire a more precise meaning
right in this sentence, if we would let it speak from how it changes in th e
process it tells about here . This mapping changes (carries forward) both
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what is "mapped," and what is mapped upon, just as the word "mapping "
does when used in this context, here .
We could show empirically that people grasp a word's precise situa-
tional meaning immediately, without first separately perceiving discret e
correspondences . I predict that people could immediately answer intri-
cate questions about the meaning of an oddly used word, but would hav e
to think a while before they could derive correspondences . I also predict
that their answers about the meaning will correlate significantly more
than their proposals for correspondences .
3. The third plank in my theory is that one can generate an endless
chain of similarities and differences from one metaphor or word-use . For
example, girls and roses are both living, beautiful, soft, fresh, natural ,
vulnerable, both grow for a long time and then come into bloom for a
short time, on and on . We can also derive endlessly numerous difference s
from one metaphor.
Johnson reads my "endlessly numerous" as if I had said that one ca n
assert just anything . Yet they all arise from the single, determinate way the
word made sense . "Ohl "we say, "Yes, I get it." Then we can say in endlessly
numerous ways what the metaphor meant, and did not mean . Its sense
is carriedforward by each such statement . Then people say (inaccurately )
that each similarity and difference "vas" implicit in the metaphor. So
many are possible because a metaphor is an unseparated multiplicity ; it
can be carried forward by isolating (finding, making, differentiating ,
synthesizing) an endless number of factors. A use-family is an
unseparated multiplicity, and so is a situation . 4 A metaphor is their
crossing, a new unseparated multiplicity.
A crossing is not the lowest common denominator, as it would be
if the two domains had only fixed characteristics . 5 Crossing lets each play
a role in shaping the result, but crossing also opens the constraints of how each
is already schematized, and reveals that each is also an intricacy. That is why
the meaning cannot be determined from the antecedents, only from th e
effect of the word in the situation.
I predict that if individuals are asked to make an inference from a
metaphorically used word, they will justify and explicate the inference in
terms of the new precise meaning, not in terms of the general definition s
they listed before knowing the situation .
The new meaning of a word is precise. Yet it need not follow de-
ductively from how one would have defined the use-family and situatio n
before the metaphor or word-use . Of course, what the word means doe s
follow from (the crossing of) the use-family and the situation, but we can
know this (nonlogical) meaning of "follow" only if we let it say how we
follow someone in ordinary speech.
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Johnson wants to emphasize that the new meanings are not de-
ducible from the old ones, but he lacks the terms for a nondeductiv e
"following . " I urge him to adopt my terms to say this . Then he could stil l
formulate the neatest array of similarities that could organize the mos t
instances, without having to read back as the cause of the process the
same sort of things that result from it. Johnson makes it clear that he
does not intend it so .
The process by which we speak every day is more precise an d
intricate than a scheme ; we have to let it happen also in how we explain .
Concepts such as "crossing" work like word-use .
Johnson speaks of correlations and resulting similarities. For Der-
rida it is differences. But both similarities and differences are implicitly
generated by the use of a word . If they are read back behind the proces s
of speech after it has happened, it seems as if speech derives from them .
Then the process is covered, made to seem its own products . I also like
products as well as process . I am not one of those who say that onl y
the journey matters, not the destination . I value the existing network o f
metaphors Johnson shows. I value destinations and products, only I don' t
reduce the process to those . Let us think from and with how it exceeds it s
products. I reverse the order : samenesses and differences are generated
from making sense in speaking and living .
Now I want to meet Johnson's challenge, and send a challenge back:
I want to show that my theory of immediate new meaning (how sayin g
these words changes this situation) can explain something that Johnso n
says but cannot explain : he emphasizes that we can make valid inferences
about the "target domain" from a metaphor, but he accounts for this as
applying "knowledge from the source domain to target." But if we know
something only about the source, and apply that to the target, we are
likely to be misled. Such a transfer of what we know about one thing to
another of which we do not know it, is the sort of case that gave metapho r
its bad reputation . If the word did not acquire a new meaning governed by the
present situation, inferences from source to target would mislead us . We would
surely be in jeopardy, if we imputed something to our love relationship ,
only because it is true of journeys !
Johnson says that love "acquires . . . vehicles, roadblocks, dead-
ends . . . and the epistemic entailments that go along with them . . . . Based on
the correspondences we make inferences, given our knowledge of the source
domain . " He means that we know something about roadblocks . What
do we know? For example, we know that a roadblock does not damage
the road. If a roadblock is removed, the road is as passable as before .
Johnson says that this knowledge enables us to infer that if what trouble s
our love relationship is removed, the relationship will be as before . But we
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cannot infer this at all! What two people call "the roadblock" may well have
damaged the road . Assume that one person did something disturbing ,
and has now stopped doing it. That person now says : everything is all
right, isn't it? I'm not doing that anymore . But the other may say: "But I
remember it every time we try to make love . When I turn on to you, I hi t
this roadblock. I can't keep on doing it." In this use the word "roadblock"
generates a different correspondence . It's not like a roadblock that leaves
an undamaged road . The "correlation" is rather with something that is
harmless when one is standing still, but disastrous when one hits it afte r
getting up speed.
Metaphors do involve valid correlations, but they are generate d
by the metaphor when the word makes new sense in the situation . The
new correspondences are generated there . The inferences are valid becaus e
they are generated from the precise new meaning in the target situation . I think
this is what Johnson means, and he could adopt my kind of concepts t o
account for it .
But if we are right, then why is metaphor so famous for fooling
people? Metaphors can fool those who do not know the target situation wel l
enough to let it give the words a new meaning . Then they are led to make
inferences just from the source domain !
It is important to free "metaphor" from naming only misleading
cases. We are quite dependent on new uses of words, so they had bette r
not be necessarily misleading! We have always only the same words of th e
language to use, after all! Metaphor is more precise and more likely t o
be true to a situation, than predefined terms .
4. Johnson reads my fourth plank as if I wanted to encompass all
eventualities, all future uses . But that is not why I speak of new uses .
They show us something about all uses of words. Johnson has done a
great deal by studying the network of metaphors . Yes, we often take well-
traveled roads . I do not denigrate his beautiful work in showing the vas t
textures of metaphors .
The fourth argument of my theory says that even when we d o
formulate statements of samenesses and differences from a metaphor ,
these do not function only as patterns would . Samenesses and difference s
function in two other ways, which enable us to explain two kinds of truth :
when it is said that the girl is a rose, we explain that it does not mean tha t
she has roots. Then, if one does say that "she is deeply rooted," this mus t
make sense : for example, "she is deeply rooted in her native soil ." The
requirement that a new use must make sense is one kind of truth. But we
don't thereby give up our denial that she has roots ; that is another kind of
truth . (Doesn't the word "truth" make sense here, both times?)
E M B O D I E D M E A N I N G A N D C O G N I T I V E S C I E N C E
We don't give up our earlier denial, although now we no longe r
deny the word "rooted" when taken in its new context. (The capacity to
take in various ways is an implicit function [see chap. 1, "Functions of the
Implicit "]) . But we do continue to deny what we denied before . No flux
here; this difference between flowers and girls is a lasting truth . Neither
of these truths is a pattern (conceptual structure, rule, form, distinction ,
category) . For example, it might seem that "roots " is the spatial
pattern of long strings dangling down . It seems safe to deny this patter n
of the girl, but someone might say, for example, that vines clung to her ,
long tendrils dangling down from her, as her lover carried her. Neither
the lasting truth nor new sense-making are governed by patterns, but i n
these two ways metaphor (word-use) is truthful and precise .
Johnson and I agree that new metaphorical meanings are not de-
rived from preexisting similarities, and that metaphors can be true . I
propose a kind of concepts that enable us to think with and about how
that happens.
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Chapter 7
Mark Johnson, Embodied Meaning and Cognitive Science
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1991) .
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Reply to Johnso n
1. A succession of research studies shows that psychotherapy clients wh o
are successful (by many criteria) engage in significantly more reference to directl y
felt events during their tape-recorded therapy hours, as measured by reliably rec -
ognizable linguistic turns . See my "What Comes After Traditional Psychotherap y
Research, " American Psychologist 41, no . 2, 131-36 .
2. One strand in our tradition assumes that reality (events, situations ,
whatever we study) consists first and primarily of mere space-and-time fillers ,
things that move in logic-like mathematical patterns . They have meaning "given "
to them only secondarily. If we recognize it, we need not make this assumption.
"The pile rises" and "the ball goes up" do not mean pure Newtonian motio n
just literally. Every word brings many uses, and we must grasp what it says here .
When "the pile rises" we know that it is because more was added ; it didn't rise like
dough. And, when "the ball goes up" we know it did not walk. Those are just as
l
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dependent on the metaphorical crossing, as when our love relationship is "reall y
going." There is no uncrossed event (experience, situation), but there i s
always an openness for further crossing .
3. In etymology words often move to neighborly realms rather than by
correspondence. "Journey" is a move of the word jour," and used to mean a
day's work or travel . It is an extension, not a similarity-correlation . "Drive" came
from driving cattle, and before that from the driven snow. It meant agitated
movement, and did not contain Johnson 's concept of "starting location ; final
location; motion." Nor does this concept fit how the word has moved today, when
many people feel "driven," always in motion, precisely without starting and fina l
locations. Only after a word has moved can we see the "concept" or correlations .
4. A situation is inherently the crossing of many possible further action s
and sayings . What it is now consists of many implicit relations to other (real an d
possible) moments and places. For example, giving someone money is now a
change in a great many (some unforeseeable) possibilities at other times an d
places. The situation is these possibilities. A situation is a cluster of stories that
might further ensue . I say that the stories are implicitly crossed because any one
that actually happens will change whether and how the others could still ensue .
Whatever happens will implicitly change all the others . (See ECM and Thinking
beyond Patterns, A5 . )
5. See my discussion of Max Black's theory in "Dwelling . "
